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Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character?
The Leaky Character Reservoir
Everett S. P. Spain, Katie E. Matthew, and Andrew L. Hagemaster

ABSTRACT: This article argues senior officers may fail in character because
their rate of character development throughout their careers typically decreases
as environmental stressors rise. It conceptualizes character as an open system
with both gains and leaks over time and integrates existing scholarship
on personality and ethical development to create the Leaky Character
Reservoir framework, which it then applies to Army off icers’ careers.
Military leaders will gain a new understanding of character and find specific
actions leaders, units, and the US Army can undertake to strengthen the
character of its senior officers.
Key words: character, ethics, personality, conditioning history, adult
development, moral development

G

ulf War hero General Norman Schwarzkopf argued that
in addition to competence, effective leaders must also have
character.1 Appropriately, character is one of three competencies
of the US Army’s Leadership Requirement Model and one of three lanes
for the US Navy’s Leader Development Framework, though both stop short
of defining character. 2 Some define character as “[doing] the right thing
when no one is watching,” “choosing the harder right over the easier wrong,”
or “having a priority concern for executing one’s duties and responsibilities
while conforming to moral codes of behavior.” 3 For the purpose of
understanding senior officers’ ethical (or unethical) decision making,
we define character as, “the propensity to take ethical and selfless actions
when facing temptation to act unethically or selfishly.” Character-based
leadership suggests character serves as a mooring for leaders, tethering the
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the reviewers, officers, and leaders who have
contributed their valuable expertise and experience to this article. We are grateful for the collective
suggestions across several organizations that improved our work overall. Correspondence concerning this
article should be addressed to Katie Matthew, Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership,
Thayer Hall, West Point, NY 10996, or by e-mail to katie.matthew@westpoint.edu.

1. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, “Address to the Corps of Cadets, United States Military Academy”
(West Point, NY, May 1, 1991), YouTube video, 25:13, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uGfrMzqNZqc.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Leadership and the Profession, Army Doctrinal
Publication (ADP) 6-22 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2019) and US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
Navy Leader Development Framework: Version 3.0 (Washington, DC: CNO, May 2019).
3. Miguel Alzola, “Even When No One Is Watching: The Moral Psychology of Corporate Reputation,”
Business & Society 58, no. 6 (2019): 1277; Robert L. Caslen Jr. and Michael D. Matthews, The Character Edge:
Leading and Winning with Integrity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020), 208; and Walter Ulmer, personal
communication (e-mail) with author, March 8, 2021.
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criteria for leader decisions to something unmoving, such as an organization’s
espoused values.

Although the Army requires its leaders to have competence and
character, the relative importance of these virtues to the Army may
have changed over time. For example, in just six months during
World War II, the US Army’s 90th Infantry Division had 20 battalion
commanders and senior officers relieved, primarily for incompetent battlefield
leadership. 4 Unfortunately, this crisis of competence was not isolated to the
90th division. At least 16 US World War II–era division commanders and
five corps commanders were similarly removed for battlefield ineffectiveness.5
Yet, this stands in stark contrast to the causes of today’s reliefs. In one year
in Iraq (2010–11), Major General Robert Caslen, then commander of the
25th Infantry Division, adjudicated the alleged misconduct of 78 officers
and senior enlisted personnel (master sergeant/first sergeant and above)
for character failures (such as improper relationships, inappropriate use of
government resources, larceny, toxicity, making false statements, alcohol
abuse, and drug abuse). In 2021’s first five months, at least three US Army
brigade commanders were relieved: one for personal misconduct, one after
allegations of misconduct, and one after allegations of counterproductive
leadership behaviors.6 Notably, we are unaware of any active-duty US Army
battalion commander, brigade commander, or general officer being formally
relieved for tactical, operational, or strategic incompetence since 2001.
Instead, perceived character failures have been the leading factor in most
modern-day officer reliefs.
Historically, commentators have considered competence and character
independently, but this may prove a false distinction since they influence
the same outcome: organizational effectiveness. Professor Don Snider
observes a leader’s character sets, or fails to set, “the culture/climate of trust
that facilitates cohesive teams, and thus military effectiveness.” 7 Similarly,
Caslen acknowledged the negative organizational ripple effects generated
by his subordinate leaders’ aforementioned misconduct. 8 Former US Army
Chief of Staff General H. K. Johnson summarized how leaders’ personal
character failures can hurt organizational effectiveness when he lamented,
“If you will cheat on your wife, you will cheat on me!”9 Additionally, senior
4. Henry G. Gole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (Lexington University Press
of Kentucky, 2008).
5. Thomas E. Ricks, “General Failure,” Atlantic (website), November 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/.
6. Davis Winkie and Kyle Rempfer, multiple articles published from April–May 2021, Army Times (website).
7. Don Snider, “Will Army 2025 Be a Military Profession?” Parameters 45, no.4, (Winter 2015–16),
https:www.press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol45/iss4/6/.
8. Robert L. Caslen Jr., personal communication (e-mail) with author, November 6, 2020.
9. Walter Ulmer, personal communication (e-mail) with author, March 28, 2021.
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leaders’ public failures can consume significant organizational energy
by diverting focus and resources from the primary mission.10 When leaders
fail, employees might be less proud to belong to the military and less likely
to remain voluntarily in the service. 11 If a platoon leader makes a significant
character mistake that becomes known, the 35 soldiers in the platoon are
negatively affected. If a battalion commander makes a character mistake that
becomes known, the 500 soldiers in the battalion are negatively affected.
Thus, the more senior leaders are, the more their character failures adversely
affect others.
Concerned about these implications, we wanted to better understand
what is driving poor decision making and what the Army can
do about it. A review of the literature shows character is a function of one’s
personality, conditioning history, and positive and negative environmental
influences. Integrating these functions with the concepts of less visible
ethical fading and erosion, we conceptualize an Army officer’s ability
to do the right thing in the face of temptation is the result of an open system
that experiences both character gains and losses over time. We illustrate this
idea with the leaky character reservoir (LCR) framework, which models
an officer’s available character as a dynamic quantity of liquid “potential
character” stored in a reservoir inside each officer.
We hypothesize the rate of character education and development
typically decreases over an Army officer’s career, while character-related
environmental stressors increase over the same period, placing senior officers
at an increased risk to experience a character gap, or shortage of character
needed to meet the demand for ethical behavior, and subsequent character
failure. Alternatively, the leaky character reservoir predicts that if the Army
increases mid-grade and senior officers’ deliberate character development
and education while mitigating character-related environmental stressors,
more senior officers will do the right thing when faced with temptation,
providing Army units with the leadership they deserve while reducing
senior-leader reliefs.
To build a shared understanding of the issue, we first present two
vignettes of character failures by hypothetical senior US Army officers.
Next, we look to theory to understand what factors determine the level
of potential character available in any officer’s reservoir. Subsequently,
10. Caslen and Matthews, Character Edge, 245.
11. Arto Lindblom, Sam Kajalo, and Lasse Mitronen, “Exploring the Links between Ethical Leadership,
Customer Orientation and Employee Outcomes in the Context of Retailing,” Management Decision 53, no. 7
(July 2015): 1642–58, https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-04-2015-0126; and Jonathan Doh, Stephen Stumpf,
and Walter G. Tymon Jr., “Responsible Leadership Helps Retain Talent in India,” Journal of Business Ethics 98
(2011): 85–100.
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we graphically illustrate the LCR framework to predict how senior officers
may end up with a character gap that can lead to character failure and
use the character reservoir to explain poor decision making by two senior
officers described in the earlier case studies. Finally, we suggest actions
individuals, units, and the Army can take to turn the senior officer character
gap into a senior officer character surplus.

Cases of Failed Character
Colonel A. A. and Personal Temptation
Although Colonel A. A. was a battle-hardened officer who had successfully
commanded a battalion task force in Syria, he was less familiar with the
nuances of commanding a separate brigade. As he prepared to deploy the
brigade to Korea, he augmented the traditional brigade staff with a handful
of additional officers from across the brigade’s battalions. One of these
officers was a junior lieutenant, initially assigned for a two-month period
to assist with key leader engagements. After two months, the colonel
extended the lieutenant’s temporary assignment and started spending time
alone with her off duty. They began a sexual affair that would last throughout
the deployment and beyond.
After redeployment, during a skit at a social gathering with family
members present, active-duty actors jokingly portrayed a junior officer
and colonel engaging in a sexual relationship. Even after the skit, no one
strongly intervened into the situation, and the relationship continued
over a three-year period until the junior officer—then a captain—
formally reported the situation. During the following court-martial,
the former brigade commander pled guilty to adultery.
Colonel B. B. and Professional Ambition
Shortly after assuming command, Colonel B. B. was excited to learn
his separate brigade combat team would be able to prove itself in an
upcoming rotation to the National Training Center (NTC). He believed his
unit’s success at NTC would be influential on his future upward mobility
in the Army. He described his leadership style as deliberate and passionate,
but he told his battalion commanders, in the stress of his brigade’s NTC
train-up, he would take a pencil and jam it into their eyes if they were not
loyal. He had public, disrespectful confrontations with his command sergeant
major and expected the spouses of his subordinate leaders to attend all events
his wife attended. Many of his subordinates felt he disregarded any voices
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other than his own or those of his few favorite officers. These behaviors
soon created five isolated battalions that shared the same unit patch but
with different priorities and cultures.
Many soldiers did not want to follow B. B. in battle, and several battalion
commanders and command sergeants major said he produced a negative
command climate and routinely threatened the future of subordinate
commanders and staff. After a formal investigation, B. B. was relieved
of command.

Four Drivers of Potential Character
To understand what led these otherwise successful senior Army officers
to make poor character choices, we must consider what influences potential
character levels and the likelihood of making an ethically sound decision(s)
in the face of strong temptation(s). Drawing on Professor Kurt Lewin’s
seminal theory that posits human behavior is a function of personality and
environment, we examine how officers’ personalities and environments drive
their ethical choices before and after joining the Army.12
Driver 1: Heredity and Experiences Growing Up
Research shows approximately 40–60 percent of personality is innate,
likely derived from heredity.13 Examples of personality traits include the “Big
Five” categories of neuroticism, extraversion, openness, conscientiousness,
and agreeableness. 14 When considering character, a multitude of additional
personality traits come into play (such as resilience, judgment, integrity,
and perseverance).15 Various studies using the Big Five categories and
character strengths as antecedents for ethical decision making illustrate how
personality influences behaviors, and thus ethical decision making.16
In addition to heredity, much of the balance of officer candidates’
character levels at entry into their pre-commissioning programs can
12. Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality: Selected Papers, trans. Donald Adams and Karl Zener
(London: Read Books Ltd., 2013).
13. Kerry Jang, John Livesley, and Philip Vernon, “Heritability of the Big Five Personality Dimensions and
Their Facets: A Twin Study,” Journal of Personality 64 (1996): 577–91.
14. Christopher Soto, “Big Five Personality Traits,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Lifespan Human Development,
ed. Mark. H. Bornstein (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2018), 240–41.
15. Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and
Classification (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).
16. Virginia Bratton and Connie Strittmatter, “To Cheat or Not to Cheat: The Role of Personality in Academic
and Business Ethics,” Ethics & Behavior 23 (2013): 427–44; Mary Crossan, Daina Mazutis, and Gerard Seijts,
“In Search of Virtue: The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths in Ethical Decision Making,” Journal
of Business Ethics 113, no. 4 (April 2013): 567–81, doi:113. 10.1007/s10551-013-1680–88; and Tamara L. Giluk
and Bennett E. Postlethwaite, “Big Five Personality and Academic Dishonesty: A Meta-Analytic Review.”
Personality and Individual Differences 72 (2015): 59–67.
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be attributed to their conditioning histories.17 For example, families,
coaches, peers, education, socioeconomic situations, and communities all
potentially influence character. These influences and experiences affect
young peoples’ personalities until young adulthood, when most scholars
argue personality becomes relatively fixed, though a minority of scholars
argue personality remains malleable longer. 18 The conditioning history
while growing up likely influences the future officer candidates’ character
by providing thousands of experiences that serve as lenses for how to view,
interpret, and behave in future similar situations. These ethical experiences
move the future officers into successive stages of adult or moral development.
Robert Kegan’s adult development theory and Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral
development theory imply that the ethically-sound conditioning from life’s
lessons will likely enable future officers to progress to a more advantaged
stage of adult identity and a higher stage of moral development, respectively.
It follows that Army officers who have reached more advanced stages of adult
or moral development should be more likely to make ethical decisions.19
Since heredity and conditioning history influence character, Army
officer candidates will have different levels of character upon starting
pre-commissioning programs. To ensure these candidates have a minimal
level of character prior to joining their programs, the Army typically requires
all candidates to pass baseline character assessments, including criminal
background checks, letters of recommendation, and face-to-face interviews.
Driver 2: Army’s Deliberate Character Development
Deliberate conditioning includes formal interventions designed
to develop character positively.20 For Army officers, this conditioning
incorporates mandatory institutional character curricula, which is part
of pre-commissioning programs, officer education schools (OES),

17. Thomas Bouchard Jr. and Matt McGue, “Genetic and Environmental Influences on Human Psychological
Differences,” Journal of Neurobiology 54 (2003): 4–45.
18. Avshalom Caspi and Brent W. Roberts, “Personality Development across the Life Course: The Argument
for Change and Continuity,” Psychological Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2001): 49–66; and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark
and Stefanie Schurer, “The Stability of Big-Five Personality Traits,” Economics Letters 115, no. 1 (2012):
11–15; and Carol S. Dweck, “Can Personality Be Changed? The Role of Beliefs in Personality and Change,”
Current Directions in Psychological Science 17, no. 6 (2008): 391–94.
19. Robert Kegan, In Over our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 1998); and Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development: The Philosophy of Moral Development
(New York: Harper & Row, 1981).
20. Matthew Erickson, Kevin Cooper, and Anthony Miccolis, “On Becoming Virtuous,” Journal of
Management Education 43, no. 6 (December 2019): 630–50, doi: 10.1177/1052562919866885.
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pre-command courses (PCC), unit-level development (LPDs/OPDs), and
self-development.
Each of the Army’s pre-commissioning programs includes deliberate
institutional curricula in character-related topics. We define deliberate
institutional character development as hours of education where character is the
primary learning objective and the curriculum is testable (papers, exams, and
exercises). Examples include teaching the Army Ethic, the Seven Army Core
Values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal
courage), and the character component of the Army Leadership Requirements
Model. Practical exercises that require students to apply these character models
and frameworks to various ethical challenges are often part of the curriculum.
As of 2021, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) two- to four-year
program includes 32 hours of deliberate institutional character development, the
United States Military Academy (USMA) four-year program includes 72 hours,
and the Officer Candidate School (OCS) 12-week program includes 18 hours.
After commissioning, officers receive six hours of character education at
the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) and three-and-a-half hours
at the Captain’s Career Course (CCC). Notably, deliberate institutional
character development does not occur again until intermediate-level
education (ILE), typically the Command and General Staff College
(CGSC), at approximately the 11th year of service, where students
receive 16 hours of development. 21 Officers also receive three hours
of character development at the lieutenant colonel–level pre-command
course and three hours at the colonel-level pre-command course.
Most officers selected for the rank of colonel attend the Army War
College (AWC) or an equivalent school, where they receive 27 hours
of direct character development. Lastly, brigadier generals attend a short
capstone course that includes an hour of deliberate character instruction.
Table 1 shows how the Army provides most brigadier generals
with approximately 100 cumulative hours of deliberate institutional
character development during their careers.

21. TRADOC program of instruction based on Army Leadership, ADP 6-22.
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Table 1. Army’s deliberate institutional character development
Second Lieutenant

Captain

Major

Pre-Commissioning
Programa

Basic Officer
Leadership Course
(BOLC)

Captain’s
Career Course
(CCC)

Intermediate-Level
Education
(ILE)b

Year Officer
Service
Development Is
Received

-4 to 0

1

5

12

Hours of Direct
Character/
Ethics
Educationc

40
(weighted average)
USMA = 72
ROTC = 32
OCS = 18

6

3.5

16

Cumulative
Hours

40

46

49.5

65.5

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel (P)

Colonel

Brigadier General

Pre-Command
Course
(PCC)

Army War College
(AWC)

Pre-Command
Course
(PCC)

Capstone

Year Officer
Service
Development Is
Received

17

21

22

26

Hours of Direct
Character/
Ethics
Educationc

3

27

3

1

Cumulative
Hours

68.5

95.5

98.5

99.5

b

Source: The authors received each of these statistics via a personal communication from
an instructor/professor who either taught or oversaw the character/ethics curriculum at
that organization. For ROTC and USMA, personal communication received December 23,
2020; for OCS, personal communication received, January 4, 2021; for BOLC, CCC, and
ILE, personal communication received August 11, 2020; for PCC, personal communication
received January 25, 2022; for AWC, personal communications received April 1 and 2, 2021;
and for Capstone, personal communication received May 11, 2021.
a. The weighted average for pre-commissioning is based on the number of officers from each
source per year. For example, while USMA cadets receive a greater number of hours, USMA
commissions about 21 percent of officers (~1,000) in a given year.
b. This does not include the 40-hour culminating exercises that include a dimension of ethical
decision making because ethics is not the primary focus of the exercises.
c. Data for all OES directly collected from course directors and instructors responsible for
curricula from 2020–21 at USMA, ROTC, OCS, Maneuver OES for BOLC/CCC, CGSC (ILE),
and PCC at Fort Leavenworth, and AWC/Capstone at Carlisle Barracks.
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Yet, when we consider deliberate character development as a rate
rather than a total quantity, an interesting trend emerges. Although
the rate (hours/year) of the Army’s deliberate character development
starts high early in officers’ careers, it decreases significantly over time.22
In sum, the Army currently provides junior officers a higher rate of deliberate
character development per year of service (in both pre-commissioning
programs and as an officer) than it provides senior officers, as illustrated
in figure 1.

Total Hours of Deliberate Character-Focused Hours/Total Years of Officer Service
Figure 1. Rate of deliberate character development for US Army officers over a career
(Note: The rate is calculated by dividing the cumulative hours of deliberate development by the total
years of off icer service, including pre-commissioning programs. For example, new captains have
an average of 49.5 hours of deliberate character development over the four years of their
pre-commissioning program and f ive years as an off icer, resulting in a deliberate institutional character
development rate of (49.5 hours/9 years=) 5.5 hours/year.)

In addition to formal character development through the officer
education schools (OES) and pre-command course (PCC) curricula,
many brigade, battalion, and company commanders institute unit-level
character development sessions and programs for subordinate officers,
including leader/officer professional development events (such as leader/
officer professional development sessions [LPDs/OPDs] and characterfocused guest speakers, book clubs, and formal mentorship programs).
Additionally, some unit leaders assign unit members who are character
exemplars to onboard new officers instead of letting the sponsor-newcomer
22. Paul Robinson, “Ethics Training and Development in the Military,” Parameters 37, no. 1 (Spring 2007):
23–36, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol37/iss1/8/.
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matching process happen by chance. Finally, motivated officers can embark
on deliberate character self-development by studying character-related
theory and ideas; reading about leaders who displayed strong character;
spending time with virtuous institutions, mentors, and friends while off duty;
and regularly and deeply reflecting on their own character and values.
Driver 3: Army Life’s Environmental Influences
In addition to an officer’s personality and deliberate character
development, Lewin’s theory notes that officers’ environments can
significantly influence their character-related behaviors. The components
of Army life’s environmental influences include checks and balances from
supervisors; virtuous (or unvirtuous) climates set by one’s institution,
boss(es), peers, and subordinates; and life’s lessons while off duty.
The Toxic Triangle framework posits that leaders need adequate checks
and balances from bosses and peers to ensure they maintain their character.
Yet, as officers gain seniority, their bosses also have more responsibility
and correspondingly less time to check subordinates.23 As leaders increase
in rank, their supervisory role often necessitates travel to cover a larger
footprint and reduces face-to-face interactions with individual subordinate
leaders. Concurrently, the emphasis on peer support and accountability
from the Army’s “battle buddy” system during the summer training portion
of pre-commissioning programs is not facilitated during officers’ subsequent
careers. As leaders advance in the Army, they have fewer interactions
with boss(es) who would notice if something character-related were offtrack
and with peers who can help prevent them from making poor character
decisions. This two-pronged lack of relational accountability over time may
become a major contributor to the ethical shortcomings of our senior leaders.
The ethical climate created by bosses, peers, subordinates, and the
Army influences character. Supervisors set, through personal example and
official/unofficial policies, a command culture (the accepted and unaccepted
character behaviors for leaders in their organization) that influences
subordinates’ behavior. Colleagues also shape the work environment
by exerting peer pressure—both intended and implied. Typically viewed
as responsive to their leader’s character, subordinates can also influence
a leader’s character. People often act like those they spend the most time

23. Art Padilla, Robert Hogan, and Robert Kaiser, “The Toxic Triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible
Followers, and Conducive Environments,” Leadership Quarterly 18 (2007): 176–94.
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with, and subordinates far outnumber leaders in hierarchical organizations.24
Finally, when leaders perceive the institution does not enact the values
it espouses, they may feel less loyal to the institution and be less likely
to make difficult character-based decisions aligned with those values.
Just as an officer’s behavior may conform to the character level of the
work environment over time, the off-duty environment can also impact the
officer’s behavior. These off-duty influences can be positive or negative, and
will likely change over time as the officer develops relationships through
hobbies, recreation, and family. In summary, each environmental factor may
lead to stronger character, conceptualized as a character gain, or weaker
character, conceptualized as a character leak.
Driver 4: Ethical Fading/Erosion
The psychological concept of ethical fading states that ethical
standards may deteriorate over time, implying character gains are not
permanent.25 This fading, also known as ethical erosion, may include factors
such as ethical drift, an incremental deviation from ethical practice that
goes unnoticed by individuals who justify the deviations as acceptable
and who believe themselves to be maintaining their ethical boundaries
and ethical fatigue, the lessoning of one’s ethical standards due to the
fatigue of having to fight ethical battles regularly. 26 There is a strong
likelihood many senior Army leaders also have less visible and persistent leaks
of potential character.
This ethical fatigue is related to stress, and while a moderate level
of stress is known to increase performance, increased span of control and
seniority can raise Army officers’ stress and lead to unhealthy conditions.
The diathesis-stress model posits when a preexisting vulnerability
undergoes prolonged stress, the individual is far more likely to develop
a disorder.27 On average, battalion commanders experience five times
the responsibility of company commanders, and brigade commanders
experience five times the responsibility of battalion commanders. The
increased stress is likely exacerbated during periods of extended or repeated
24. Jing Qian et al., “Ethical Leadership, Leader-Member Exchange and Feedback Seeking:
A Double-Moderated Mediation Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work-Unit Structure.” Frontiers
Psychology 8 (2017): 1174, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01174.
25. Ann Tenbrunsel and David Messick, “Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-deception in Unethical Behavior,”
Social Justice Research 17, no. 2 (2004): 223–36.
26. Carole Kleinman, “Ethical Drift: When Good People Do Bad Things,” JONA’s HealthCare Law, Ethics and
Regulations 8, no. 3 (2006): 72–76; and Cannon et. al., “Ethical Erosion: How Far from Center Are You? You May
Be Further Than You Think,” Journal of Health Care Compliance 17, no. 5 (2015): 11–64.
27. “APA Dictionary of Psychology – Diathesis-Stress Model,” American Psychological Association (website),
n.d., accessed October 31, 2021, https://dictionary.apa.org/diathesis-stress-model.
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collective training cycles and deployments. Over time, these stressful
events can lead to physical, emotional, and mental exhaustion, burnout,
and an increased likelihood of developing post-traumatic stress disorder. 28
Senior officers may also compensate for increased responsibilities (both
emotional and operational) by reducing sleep time, which further affects
stress levels, resulting in the propensity to engage in unethical conduct.29
Finally, senior officers often change duty stations more frequently than
junior officers, and moving is one of the largest stressors on individuals
and families.30 Author Wade Goodall notes that “many leaders [who] have
become involved in an adulterous encounter have been overtired, stressed
out, and/or have a feeling of emptiness.” 31 A senior officer’s likelihood
of acting in an irrational way increases with the presence of stress.
Along with the probable increase in unhealthy stress comes an increase
in external temptation. As a leader’s seniority and power increase, some
individuals seek to develop access to those leaders for less-than-honorable
purposes. Additionally, increasing seniority gives leaders more control
over personnel decisions, organizational budgets, and strategic direction,
often without a parallel increase in oversight; therefore the level
of temptation typically increases with seniority.
Yet, these same Army leaders are likely overconfident in their ability
to manage this increased stress and temptation. A facilitator of senior
officer education recently shared that most “[senior officers] know right
from wrong. What stuns me is the number who think they are the ones
that won’t get caught.”32 Since senior officers have been successful for
so long (without being found with a major character failure), they are
at risk of developing a perception of invulnerability, which could lead
to decision making that further stresses their character, making the officer
even more vulnerable.33 When this perceived invulnerability parallels the rise

28. Christopher M. Barnes et al., “Leader Sleep Devaluation, Employee Sleep, and Unethical Behavior,”
Sleep Health 6, no. 3 (2020): 411–17; and Oronzo Parlangeli et al., “Perceptions of Work-Related Stress and
Ethical Misconduct amongst Non-Tenured Researchers in Italy,” Science and Engineering Ethics 26, no. 1 (2019):
159–81.
29. Christopher M. Barnes, John Schaubroeck, Megan Huth, and Sonia Ghumman, “Lack of Sleep and
Unethical Conduct,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 115, no. 2 (2011): 169–80, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.01.009.
30. Sarah Kershaw, “The Psychology of Moving,” New York Times, February 28, 2010.
31. Wayde Goodall, Why Great Men Fall: 15 Winning Strategies to Rise Above It All (New York: New Leaf
Press, 2005), 56.
32. Personal communication with author, May 11, 2021.
33. Dean Ludwig and Clinton Longenecker, “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful
Leaders,” Journal of Business Ethics 12, no. 4 (1993): 265–73.
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in the senior leader’s influence, larger organizations can experience immense
negative consequences if their leader fails in character.34

Integrating the Four Drivers of Character:
The Leaky Character Reservoir
To integrate and illustrate the four drivers of character, we present
character as an open system called the Leaky Character Reservoir (LCR).
Imagine each person has a hypothetical internal reservoir that stores
potential character in liquid form. Every time the officer exhibits a positive
character influence from the drivers, the amount of potential character
in the reservoir increases by at least a drop. Alternatively, every instance
of unethical character-related influence from the drivers causes the reservoir
to leak. The potential for ethical fading and erosion is always present,
resulting in persistent, but less-noticeable leaks.
The reservoir stores potential character. When a character challenge
(temptation) appears, we posit an officer with the necessary levels
of potential character in his or her reservoir will have the strength to choose
the harder right over the easier wrong and take the more ethical action.
Conversely, if the officer does not have the requisite amount of potential
character to meet the ethical challenges, the officer is unlikely to make
ethically sound decisions, and character failure may result.

34. Jim Detert, Choosing Courage: The Everyday Guide to Being Brave at Work (Boston: Harvard Business
Press, 2021).
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Figure 2. Leaky Character Reservoir

Modeling the LCR over Time: Senior Officer Character Gap
By examining how the drivers of character change over a typical officer’s
career, it becomes clear that seniority brings more temptation, often through
stress and privileged access to objects, information, and people.35 Yet, over the
same period, senior officers experience a lower rate of deliberate character
development, deal with increased stress, and are less likely to receive adequate
checks and balances from their peers and bosses. Since other influences vary
widely across people and time (unit-level development, self-development,
character of those around the leader, and off-duty life’s curriculum), the net
result is the senior officer character gap. Simply put, some senior officers

35. Ludwig and Longenecker, “Bathsheba Syndrome.”
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may not have enough potential character in their reservoir to confront the
increasing temptations to be selfish.

Figure 3. Current senior officer character gap

Leaky Character Reservoir Applied to Colonels A. A. and B. B.
Colonels A. A. and B. B. passed the character screening to enter
pre-commissioning sources, where they received a baseline level of deliberate
character education. They then attended officer basic courses, where they
received additional deliberate character instruction. At that point, the rate
of deliberate character education began to decrease over their
remaining careers.
Colonels A. A. and B. B. led geographically separate brigade combat
teams; therefore, neither had a co-located peer with whom they interacted
frequently. Consequently, there was no one to notice and initiate the difficult
conversation with A. A. about his potential inappropriate relationship
or B. B. about his increasing perceived toxicity with subordinates.
The geographically isolated environment led to both receiving less than
adequate checks and balances from their bosses. Both experienced ethical
fading and erosion, as they had participated in multiple deployments prior
to their brigade commands. As they were leading a unit approximately
five times larger than before, each likely dealt with a proportional increase
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in serious problems and were under the heightened stress of preparing units
for deployment to combat or to a major training center rotation. Both may
have felt an inaccurate perception of invulnerability, as their poor choices
were not isolated incidents but a continuation of choices without being held
responsible over years (A. A.) or months (B. B.). At the critical moment,
neither had the potential character available to match the temptations they
faced. Judging from the number of reliefs for character across today’s senior
officer corps, other senior officers likely suffer from a similar character gap.

Moving from a Character Gap to a Character Surplus
Collectively, the US Army’s current character development programs
assume character gains are permanent. Unlike the one hour of daily physical
fitness training required by most Army units, few units have regular
character training, and while the Army tests everyone’s fitness level twice
a year, it rarely conducts character assessments. This character training and
testing may not be needed if leaders’ character gains are permanent. Yet, the
LCR framework argues that an Army officer’s level of potential character
is conceptually similar to his or her level of physical fitness. Both are likely
to atrophy if neglected over time.
The Army should address the problem by acknowledging that character
gains are not permanent. While the Army can do little to increase the
rate of character at entry or eliminate ethical erosion, military leadership
can increase deliberate character development and mitigate environmental
influences, with the intent of closing the senior officer character gap and
creating a character surplus.

Mechanisms to Increase Deliberate Character Conditioning
The Army can increase the quantity (rate) of deliberate character
conditioning across the officer education schools (OES). Since the rate
of character education decreases significantly as seniority increases,
the Army can increase and/or tailor the amount of character education
in mid- and senior-level education programs (intermediate level education
[ILE], Army War College [AWC], pre-command courses [PCCs],
and Capstone) to reverse this trend. Special emphasis on the character
demands of senior officers should be a part of deliberate conditioning later
in an officer’s career. Naturally, the character education’s quality matters and
should also be a priority. Part of this education should be self-awareness
generated by studying the LCR framework, especially the concept that
the level of one’s potential character can shift over time. During these
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educational experiences, the Army should require officers to study numerous
recent case studies of senior officers who failed in character in tandem
with case studies where officers chose the harder right. Additionally, the
Army should require mid-grade and senior officers to engage in deliberate
reflection designed to examine character weaknesses and risks honestly
by having operational psychologists administer confidential psychometric
assessments of self-awareness, empathy, self-regulation, compulsive behavior,
and narcissism.
Organization leaders should be incentivized and enabled to enact
quality unit-level character development. They should ask institutional
organizations (such as the Center for Army Leadership, the Army War
College, the United States Military Academy, and the Combined Arms
Center) to provide, and regularly update, character-focused officer and
leader professional development programs (OPDs/LPDs) so they can
be easily accessed and implemented by unit leaders. Additionally, units
should be required to implement local character-development programs,
including onboarding programs, to be briefed to bosses at quarterly
training briefings.
Senior officers should be required to attend Army-sponsored resiliencybuilding programs/counseling that include a secular or religious-based
spiritual wellness component. Character and moral growth are often
developed through spiritual practice and can provide a constant during
periods of change during an officer’s career.36 The value of workplace
spirituality, characterized by a sense of community and alignment with
the organization’s espoused values, can positively impact an individual’s
moral judgment and an organization’s ethical climate. 37 Army leadership
can reach out to organizations that can host resiliency-building programs,
including the Army’s Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation; Army
Community Service offices; chaplains; Army medical providers; and others.
The Army should incentivize individual mid-grade and senior officers
to invest in character development. By providing officers with an annual
stipend of up to $5,000 to invest in individual character development efforts
(such as book purchases, civilian character workshops and academic courses,
and executive coaching with a character focus), Army leadership could create
36. Peterson and Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues.
37. Badrinarayan Shankar Pawar, “Individual Spirituality, Workplace Spirituality and Work Attitudes:
An Empirical Test of Direct and Interaction Effects,” Leadership & Organization Development Journal 30,
no. 8 (2009): 759–77; and Lilian Otaye-Ebede, Samah Shaffakat, and Scott Foster, “A Multilevel Model
Examining the Relationships between Workplace Spirituality, Ethical Climate and Outcomes: A Social Cognitive
Theory Perspective,” Journal of Business Ethics 166, no. 3 (2019): 611–26.
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a positive environment for character development, and encourage raters and
senior raters to document and reward self-improvement efforts positively.
Additionally, the Army must ensure all officers, especially isolated
commanders, have an adequate level of checks and balances. Senior
leaders must prioritize regular time spent with subordinate commanders
in a deliberate coaching/developmental mode. Creating a healthy culture
requires being present and getting to know subordinate commanders and
their organizations. When interacting with subordinate commanders, senior
officers should discuss and recognize acts of character as much, or more
than, they talk about and reward organizational fitness, marksmanship,
reenlistment, readiness, and other traditional unit-level accomplishments.
In addition to requiring the regular review of subordinates’ climate
assessments (Commander 360, Defense Organizational Climate Survey,
etc.), superior officers should host thoughtful, realistic discussions with
subordinate commanders on practical daily actions that demonstrate
an ethical life and ethical climate while recommending and resourcing steps,
events, and courses that can build character along the way.
Army leaders should increase checks and balances through fostering
values-based friendships in the form of peer-accountability groups.
Each year, after officers are selected and slated as principal lieutenant
colonel- or colonel-level commanders at command assessment programs,
the Army should assign groups of four-to-six to peer-accountability
groups (PAGs) based on professional and personal preferences, interests,
and future command locations. When possible, officers who have different
senior raters should be put together to reduce the chance of competition.
In their article on best practices of peer support groups, Boris Groysberg
and Robert Halperin explain, “Members also build camaraderie and form
connections that help them feel safe, grounded, and capable in a volatile
and uncertain world. The support they receive in forums sustains them
through their toughest professional (and personal) challenges and
fosters their long-term success.”38 With the help of an Army-funded
civilian executive coach, these PAGs would meet (virtually or in person)
for 90 minutes every other month to check in with a series of structured
questions, including sharing character challenges and successes and allowing
open time for free-flow discussion. Annually, each member should assess the
PAG’s effectiveness, with the Army switching members as needed to ensure

38. Boris Groysberg and Robert Halperin, “How to Get the Most out of Peer Support Groups,”
Harvard Business Review (May–June 2022).
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the PAGs build positive, peer-accountability groups built on trust, values,
and fit.

Mechanisms to Mitigate Character Losses
from Army Life’s Environmental Influences
The Army can reduce stress by creating five years of predictability
for battalion command selects. The period after selection for battalion
command can be extremely unpredictable and stressful for senior officers and
their families, including up to four moves over five years. Military leadership
could provide the Army’s new command-assessment program principal
selectees with the ability to choose a command location, senior service
college, and follow-on job locations and timing of moves. Additionally,
senior officers could be stabilized at locations by changing the implicit career
expectation that general officers hold two jobs at each level to holding one
job for twice as long.
The Army could also reduce stress through sabbaticals. Giving senior
officers six- to 12-month sabbaticals between major assignments without
other work responsibilities would provide them time to reduce stress levels,
prioritize health and relationships, and recharge.39 During sabbaticals,
officers would participate in required guided reflection with assigned
mentors. Periods of education (for example, OES and advanced civilian
schooling) are good for this, but senior officers would still have full-time
responsibilities during educational assignments. With periods of reduced
responsibilities, officers can learn new hobbies, regularly spend quality time
with children, travel recreationally, and take better care of themselves.40
The Army can decrease the risk of stress by providing senior officers
regular emotional/mental health assessment and tools. Since emotional and
mental health can affect decision making, implementing in-depth health
screenings as part of lieutenant colonel- and colonel-level PCCs will help
prevent mental and emotional states that could lead to unethical decisions.
Battalion commanders and above should be issued health-tracking smart
devices, like smart rings that measure and give reliable feedback on sleep
and exercise quantity and quality, so they can monitor and improve health.
39. Melissa Servier, “The Healthy Practice of Pastoral Sabbaticals,” Presbyterian Outlook 199, no. 9 (June 2017):
32; Mohammad Yarmohammadian, Patricia Davidson, and Chao Yeh, “Sabbatical as a Part of the Academic
Excellence Journey: A Narrative Qualitative Study,” Journal of Education and Health Promotion 7, no. 1 (2018):
119; and Gabrielle Simionato, Susan Simpson, and Corinne Reid, “Burnout as an Ethical Issue in Psychotherapy,”
Psychotherapy 56, no. 4 (2019): 470–82.
40. Lee Tobin McClain, “A Sabbatical Ends,” Chronicle of Higher Education 53, no. 7 (October 2006).
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the US
the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
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Taking a holistic approach to sustaining the character of senior officers may
not fully prevent a character failure, but it can slow the leaks and reinforce
the character reserves built over a lifetime.

Conclusion
The Leaky Character Reservoir framework conceptualizes a person’s
potential character as a resource stored in an open system, with gains
and leaks over time. When modeled across a senior Army officer’s career,
the rate of formal character development typically decreases. In contrast,
environmental character stressors increase, leading to slow leaks from the
reservoir and, eventually, the potential for a character gap. To address this
problem, the Army and unit leaders should recognize that character gains
are not permanent and increase the rate of deliberate character development
across formal and unit- and individual-level initiatives and promote positive
environmental influences while mitigating negative ones. By taking these
recommendations and other thoughtful actions, the Army can ensure
future senior officers develop enough potential character to make selfless
choices and take positive actions when faced with significant temptations,
resulting in higher-quality leadership, better-developed subordinates,
more-ready units, and a stronger Army.
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